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A hodological law causes the evolution of the universe to tend to follow particular types of path.
I give simple illustrations in toy models and discuss how Kolmogorov complexity characterises the
extent to which hodological laws explain, rather than merely describe, data.
INTRODUCTION
If the probabilities we calculate in quantum theory are probabilities of some well-defined, objective, observer-
independent features of nature, then a complete formulation of quantum theory has to include a sample space on
which these probabilities are defined. The elements of that sample space form configurations of beables, in Bell’s
terminology. Whatever form they take, if they form part of physics as we understand it they presumably have a
mathematical structure. It then makes sense to consider generalisations of quantum theory in which the probabilities
depend on that structure as well as the Born rule.
This motivates looking at alternatives [1, 2] to cosmological theories inspired by the standard understanding of
quantum theory. Whatever the fine-grained form of the beables, generalised probability laws associated with them
could also affect the probabilities of coarse-grained large-scale features of the universe. The very large scale seems
perhaps the most promising regime in which to look for empirical evidence of such deviations from quantum theory,
since the strongest evidence for quantum theory comes from small scale phenomena, the relationship between quantum
theory and gravity is not known, and there are other outstanding cosmological puzzles that suggest other lacunae in
our understanding.
Theories that are based on quantum theory but guide the universe along paths other than those implied by standard
unitary quantum dynamics are not yet part of standard mainstream discourse. They impose constraints, in a statistical
sense. However, these theories are qualitatively different from quantum theory applied to constrained systems [3].
They are far more general than theories with independent initial and final boundary conditions. They are also far
more general than dynamical collapse models, although dynamical collapse models can be seen as examples and can
motivate others. Indeed, the generality they allow may raise a concern that considering such theories takes us out of
the domain of science: that they can describe data but cannot explain them in any standard scientific sense.
I explain below why this concern is misplaced, using simple models that show why these “hodological” theories are
qualitatively different, illustrate their generality and explain the extent to which they could nonetheless be scientifically
useful.
HODOLOGY IN THE EHRENFEST URN MODEL
The Ehrenfest urn model [4] nicely illustrates the effect of laws describing a statistical evolution from an initial
state. It can be generalized to illustrate laws with independent initial and final boundary conditions [5]. As we discuss
below, it can also be generalized to illustrate hodological laws.
The standard version of the Ehrenfest urn model begins with N labelled balls distributed between two urns (A and
B) in some initial configuration (for example, all in urn A, or balls 1 to bN2 c in A and the rest in B). The model’s state
changes in discrete time steps, at each of which one label is chosen randomly, and the corresponding ball switches
urn. It is easy to see (analytically or numerically) that low entropy distributions typically evolve quickly towards and
then fluctuate around equipartition, spending nearly all the time close to equipartition and returning to low entropy
states very infrequently.
We consider the model with some number T of time steps that is fixed in advance. One might think of this as a
toy model of a universe with a fixed cosmological lifetime between its initial and final state. We take the numbers of
balls NA and NB = N − NA in urns A,B to be the macro-physical variables of interest, and the locations of each
labelled ball to be micro-physical variables. Macrophysically, the possible evolutions from the initial state NA = N
0
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2are thus given by sequences
NA = (N
0
A, N
1
A, . . . , N
T
A ) , (1)
where N iA = N
i−1
A ± 1. The sequence NA has probability
Prob(NA) =
T∏
i=1
(δ(N iA −N i−1A , 1)
N −N i−1A
N
+ δ(N iA −N i−1A ,−1)
N i−1A
N
) . (2)
We are interested in hodological generalisations that alter, and are defined in terms of, the macrophysics. To define
such a model, we modify Eqn. (2), reweighting the probabilities by non-negative factors w(NA) that depend on the
form of the path NA through configuration space. Thus
Probmod(NA) = Cw(NA)Prob(NA) , (3)
where C is a normalisation constant chosen so that∑
NA
Probmod(NA) = 1 . (4)
Simple examples
Example 1 (fixed macrophysical path points): Let N = 10, T = 20, N0A = 5, and take
w(NA) = δ(N
10
A , 5)δ(N
20
A , 5) . (5)
This weighting ensures that the realised evolution path has an equipartition as its initial and final states and also at
the midpoint of its evolution. A sample evolution is shown in Fig. 1.
FIG. 1: Single run of N = 10 balls, constrained to NA = NB = 5 at t = 0, 10 and 20.
Example 2 (weighting towards a given macrophysical path): If, again with N = 10, T = 20, N0A = 5,
we take
w(NA) = exp(−1
6
20∑
t=1
(NA(t)− (5− t
4
))2) , (6)
then the realised evolution path is likely to be relatively close to the line NA(t) = (5 − t4 ). Sample evolutions are
shown in Fig. 2.
3FIG. 2: 5 runs of N = 10 balls, initial state NA = NB = 5 at t = 0, drawn from an ensemble with evolution probabilities
modified by the weight factor (6).
Testing hodological laws
Suppose now, for the sake of discussion, that we observe a new physical system whose properties are opaque to
us, except for one discrete physical parameter that appears to evolve as though following some type of Ehrenfest urn
model. That is, there is one observable discrete parameter, NA, which appears always to lie in the range 0 ≤ NA ≤ 10.
We observe its value only at discrete time steps t, after each of which it increases or decreases by 1. Suppose we
cannot measure anything else about the system (perhaps it is effectively a black box, or a very distant cosmological
object that regularly emits a discrete signal). Suppose also that, while we cannot directly observe the system’s internal
structure, extrapolating our knowledge of other better understood systems, and examining the evolution statistics
of NA, lead us to the strong hypothesis that it is characterised by some Ehrenfest model, with labelled subsystems
playing roles analogous to those of the balls and urns. Suppose also that we have no information or good hypothesis
about any interaction with other systems. And suppose that the system goes through repeated runs of 20 time steps,
apparently resetting (say after a gap of 10 time steps, so that individual runs are identifiable) after each, with each
run starting with NA = 5.
After a while, we will conclude that, so long as we learn nothing more about the system, the only immediately
scientifically fruitful theories we can make about it are defined by generalised Ehrenfest urn models of the form (3).
We can evaluate these by Bayesian reasoning. Informally, this would run roughly as follows. First, if our physical
theories (the new system aside) take their current form, defined by initial states and standard evolution laws, then
before we examine the data we would assign a high prior weight to the standard Ehrenfest probability law (2), i.e.
to Cw(NA) = 1 for all paths NA. We might assign a lower prior weight to the hypothesis that any modification of
the form (3) gives a better theory, and we would almost certainly assign low prior weights to specific modified laws
like (5) and (6). But since the system is novel and mysterious, we should and probably would be undogmatic: every
specific law L would be assigned a non-zero prior weight Probprior(L).
Suppose that on the first run we observed an evolution of the form of Fig. 1. According to the standard Ehrenfest
probability law (2), the probability of equipartition of 10 balls at t = 10, given initial equipartition, is 9645331953125 ≈ 12 .
The probability of equipartition at both t = 10 and t = 20, given initial equipartition, is thus ≈ 14 .
Bayesian hypothesis testing, given data D, assigns the posterior probability weight
Probpost(L) =
Prob(D |L)Probprior(L)∑
i Prob(D |Li)Probprior(Li)
, (7)
where the sum is over the set (which we assume countable) of all laws considered.
After the resulting Bayesian reweighting, our posterior weights for some of our modified laws would thus be smaller
or zero, and our weight for (5) would (for sensible values of Probprior(Li) ) be somewhat larger. If our prior confidence
in the law defined by Eqn. (2) was high, our posterior confidence would still be high. However, if we saw M runs, all
of which produced evolutions with equipartition at t = 10 and t = 20, the numerator in our posterior weight for (2)
will be scaled by ( 14 )
M , while the corresponding expression for Eqn. (5) remains unchanged. If the evolutions appear
to be otherwise random, then our posterior weights for Eqn. (5) increase with M , tending to 1 for large M . In other
words, we would eventually become very confident that the system is in fact governed by Eqn. (5),
4Suppose instead that we saw an evolution of the type illustrated by Fig. 2. According to the standard Ehrenfest
urn model, the probability of an evolution as close as these to the line NA(t) = (5 − t4 ) is roughly 1 in 50000. Even
after a single run, unless our prior weight for any law other than (2) was significantly less than 2 × 10−5, we would
significantly lose confidence in (2) and begin considering alternative laws seriously. After a small number of runs, we
would likely arrive at something like Eqn. (6) as our best fit to the data.
Since known physical laws are based on probabilistic or deterministic evolution from initial conditions, we might
think a system apparently described by a modified Ehrenfest urn model such as (5) or (6) must very likely have some
additional internal mechanism and associated variables hidden from us, so that the complete system is described by
a more conventional law. We might then continue to search for ways of observing the hidden variables and obtaining
a better and more detailed model. Still, unless and until we succeeded, the relevant modified Ehrenfest urn model
would be our best description. And we might not succeed: there need not necessarily be any internal mechanism that
gives any deeper explanation.
Formally, these calculations can be underpinned by the theory of Solomonoff induction and the principle of minimum
description length (MDL) for hypothesis identification [6]. Roughly speaking, according to the MDL principle, the
best hypothesis to fit the data is the one that minimizes the sum of the length of the program required to frame
the hypothesis and the length of the string required to characterize the data given the hypothesis. The latter is
approximately the Shannon entropy S(H) of the probability distribution on paths in variable space implied by the
hypothesis H. The former is the length L(H) of a program mapping ≈ S(H) bit strings to paths that, according to
hypothesis H, are typical. If H0 is given by (2), H1 by (5) and H2 by (6), then for a single run
S(H0)− S(H1) ≈ 2 , S(H0)− S(H2) ≈ 16 . (8)
For M runs, L(Hi) is fixed, while
S(H0)− S(H1) ≈ 2M , S(H0)− S(H2) ≈ 16M . (9)
Hence, if H1 or H2 fit the data, their description length becomes less than that of H0 for large M , and they become
preferred to H0; if no more refined hypothesis fits the data then they become the MDL hypothesis. The same is true
of any hypothesis H such that S(H0)− S(H) > 0.
DISCUSSION
The Ehrenfest urn model illustrates how a model with probabilistic microdynamics can be modified by macrodynam-
ical laws that guide macroscopic variables towards particular paths. Such laws themselves may be either deterministic
(as in example (5)) or probabilistic (as in example (6)). It also illustrates how standard scientific inference can identify
such laws, if they offer a compressed description of the observed data.
Exactly the same points apply when we consider a microdynamics given by any version of quantum theory that
makes probabilistic predictions about the microdynamics underpinning the physics of a macroscopic system, including
in principle the evolution of the universe. As we have seen, one can model the evolution of a physical system via
an Ehrenfest urn model without committing to identifying specific subsystems as balls and urns, or even committing
to the belief that such subsystems necessarily exist. Similarly, one can search for modified macrodynamical laws in
nature while remaining agnostic about precisely which events, beables, or histories define the fundamental sample
space for quantum theory.[7] The task is more complicated, because there are many more possibly relevant variables
and types of law. Nonetheless, the methodology of Solomonoff induction applies. A systematic search for modified
macrodynamical laws that might fit observation better than standard quantum theory should be a major goal of
cosmological science, since in a strong sense it would necessarily advance our knowledge. Null results, excluding all
laws of a given type up to a given degree of complexity, would solidify and parametrise our confidence in the standard
paradigm. New laws would qualitatively change our understanding of nature.
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